
















1.1. The aim of this paper
This paper examines the impact of 
democratisation on doctors’ political in-
fluence on health policy changes. Con-
sidering that doctors monopolise medi-
cal expertise and deliver medical service 
in medical institutions, securing their 
co-operation is indispensable for the 
successful implementation of a health 
care policy. Thus, the politics of pro-
fession needs to be considered for ana-
lysing the policy-making process of the 
health care policy. 
Democratisation seems to change 
doctors’ political influence in the pro-
cess of health care policy-making. On 
Sang Hun Lim
PhD student,







INFLUENCE: THE SEPARATION 
OF PRESCRIBING AND 
DISPENSING (SPD) IN KOREA
Summary  This paper is about the relationship between democratisation and doctors’ 
political influence in health policy, in the case of the separation of prescribing and dis-
pensing (SPD) in Korea. Due to their professional as well as institutional features, doc-
tors have been regarded as one of the most powerful pressure groups. Democratisation 
may have two mutually conflicting influences: (1) doctors’ veto capacity may increase with 
their strengthened voice vis-à-vis the government; and (2) it may decrease, as not only 
doctors’ central association but also other social groups, such as medical consumers and 
sub-groups of doctors, acquire stronger voices. This paper analyses the case of the SPD 
in Korea, which prevented doctors from dispensing drugs. It compares the SPD process 
in the authoritarian period (1982-1985), the transition period (1987-1991) and the demo-
cratic period (1998-2000). It concludes that doctors’ political influence increases in the 
transition period, and then decreases as democratisation matures.

























the one hand, democratisation alters 
the structure of the policy-making pro-
cess by inviting wider social actors in the 
process. On the other hand, democrati-
sation promotes the freedom of assem-
bly and association which facilitates so-
cial actors to conduct collective actions 
outside of formal policy-making pro-
cesses. 
The analysis of doctors’ influence on 
health care policies in this paper is based 
on the case of the separation of prescrib-
ing and dispensing (SPD) policy in Ko-
rea. The SPD is a policy which regulated 
doctors not to dispense drugs but to issue 
prescriptions for pharmacists. A study 
of the process of the SPD in Korea helps 
examine the impact of democratisation 
on doctors’ veto capacity. The Korean 
government attempted to implement 
this in three periods: 1982-1985, 1987-
-1991, and 1998-2000. These periods 
overlap with distinctive sequences of de-
mocratisation. An authoritarian govern-
ment ruled during the first period; the 
transition to democracy was under way 
in the second; and the democratic oppo-
sition finally took power in the final pe-
riod. Therefore, examining doctors’ ef-
forts to hinder the SPD will help analyse 
the relationship between democratisa-
tion and doctors’ veto capacity. 
1.2. Method
This paper conducts empirical re-
search on three periods in which the 
government attempted to implement the 
SPD: 1982-1985, 1987-1991, and 1998-
-2000. These periods belong to distinc-
tive phases of democratisation: an au-
thoritarian regime, a transitional regime 
and a democratic regime. 
This paper applies a new institution-
al approach. It analyses how political in-
stitutions transferred actors’ ideas and 
preferences into policy results. Among 
various forms (and meanings) of insti-
tutions, this paper focuses on structures 
of the policy-making process. It exami-
nes how structures of the policy-making 
process change doctors’ influences on 
policy outputs. Some scholars put this 
approach in the category of historical in-
stitutionalism (Rothstein, 1996; Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992), while others create 
a new category, such as ‘structural insti-
tutionalism’ (Peters, 1996) and ‘organi-
zational institutionalism’ (Immergut, 
1998). In this way, this research analy-
ses the structures of the policy-mak-
ing process of the SPD to see how these 
structures facilitate or limit doctors’ in-
fluences on the SPD policy. 
The main materials for this research 
are documents and interviews. Such 
documents as records, announcements 
and reports published by the govern-
ment, especially the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MoHW) and the Nation-
al Assembly, and by interest groups, are 
reviewed. The author conducted thirty 
semi-structured interviews with politi-
cians, civil servants, and interest group 
leaders.
1.3. Plan of this paper
Section 2 describes the features of 
the SPD and its policy-making pro-
cess. This section also demonstrates doc-
tors’ organisational position in the poli-
cy-making process. Section 3 reviews 
the impacts of democratisation on doc-
tors’ political influence. Then, section 4 
analyses the process of the SPD and doc-
tors’ veto efforts in the light of demo-
cratisation. It describes and compares 
the SPD processes of the authoritarian 
period (1982-1985), the transition peri-
od (1987-1991) and the democratic pe-
















cusses the implication of this research. 
It concludes that in the first stage of de-
mocratisation, i.e. the transition peri-
od, doctors’ political influence may in-
crease. By contrast, as democratisation 
matures, doctors’ political influence may 
decrease. 
2. SPD and its policy-making process 
2.1. SPD and doctors in Korea
The separation of prescribing and 
dispensing (SPD) is a policy which re-
gulates doctors only to prescribe drugs, 
and pharmacists to dispense them only 
according to prescriptions. It is impor-
tant to understand the SPD for studying 
health politics in East Asia. The SPD has 
been related to other more popular poli-
cies, such as the reform of the National 
Health Insurance (NHI), resolving con-
flicts between Oriental and Occiden-
tal medicines, regulating generic sub-
stitution, promoting the transparency 
of the pharmaceutical market, and even 
ensuring the patients’ right to informa-
tion. The very fact that the SPD, which is 
hardly a serious issue in Western coun-
tries, has been related to many other po-
licies makes it an interesting topic for 
understanding the unique character of 
the East Asian health care system.
In East Asian countries, the roles of 
doctors and pharmacists were not clearly 
separated, and medical consumers could 
take medical examination and dispensa-
tion of drugs at the same place (one-stop 
system). Thus, the SPD was considered 
not only in Korea but also in Japan and 
Taiwan (Howells and Neary, 1995; Rod-
win and Okamoto, 2000; Chou et al., 
2003).
In Korea, although the government 
has regulated the health care system by 
the National Health Insurance (NHI) 
scheme, more than 80 per cent of hos-
pital beds have been privately owned 
(Cho, 1999: 79), and the expenditure for 
health care has remained below 2 per 
cent in the total government expendi-
ture (Yang, 2003: 33). In this dominantly 
privatised medical system, distribution 
of drugs has been one of significant in-
come sources for hospitals and clinics, 
considering that expenditures for drugs 
have comprised about 30 per cent of the 
total health care expenditures (Chung 
et al., 1997: 102). In addition, doctors 
have been willing to be publicly recog-
nised for their expertise in drugs. There-
fore, doctors have generally been little 
supportive to the implementation of the 
SPD, which would deprive them of this 
income, as well as damage their profes-
sional pride as experts in drugs. 
2.2. Policy-making process of the SPD
Until 2000 the Pharmaceutical Af-
fairs Law allowed doctors to distribute 
drugs to their own patients (Pharma-
ceutical Affairs Law, enacted on 13 De-
cember 1963, Supplementary Provision 
No. 1491, Article 3). Therefore, if the re-
vision of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law 
was the instrument for the SPD, the Le-
gislature – the National Assembly – 
made the final decision. 
However, a government ministry – 
the Ministry of Health and Social Af-
fairs (MHSA; The Ministry of Health 
and Welfare [MoHW] since December 
1994) – was in charge of issues of the 
health care system, including the imple-
mentation of the SPD. Without revis-
ing the Law, the MHSA could encourage 
doctors to issue prescriptions for phar-
macists, instead of distributing drugs by 
themselves. The MHSA could provide 
guidelines on prescription and distribu-
























for the SPD. In other words, the MHSA 
could promote the SPD by utilising its 
administrative discretions. 
Even if the revision of the Pharma-
ceutical Affairs Law would be at issue, 
the MHSA could play a significant role 
by providing a government bill of the 
Law. Instead of providing all details of 
the Law, the National Assembly usually 
asked the MHSA to propose a bill, and 
then the National Assembly reviewed 
the bill and revised it. In this way, the 
MHSA not only executed the deci-
sions of the National Assembly, but also 
helped the legislating process by prepar-
ing a government bill. 
Doctors could directly participate in 
the policy-making process by attending 
government committees. When a health 
care policy was discussed, the MHSA 
usually set up a consultative committee 
which was joined by representatives of 
professional groups, including doctors. 
Doctors also contacted Assemblymen 
and MHSA officials for persuading their 
policy preferences. In addition, doctors 
may be able to mobilise collective ac-
tions outside of the policy-making pro-
cess. 
In these processes of representing 
doctors’ society, the Korea Medical As-
sociation (KMA) was at the centre. The 
KMA has been doctors’ central associ-
ation, not only socially but also legally. 
The Medical Law has stipulated compul-
sory membership in the KMA, compel-
ling all doctors to register in the KMA 
(Medical Law, revised on 20 May 1962, 
Article 17; Article 52). The KMA repre-
sented doctors in government commit-
tees, contacted government officials and 
Assemblymen, and organised and led 
doctors’ society. 
3. Democratisation and doctors’ 
political influence
3.1. Doctors’ political influence
Inside of the formal policy-making 
process
Doctors may utilise the structures 
of the policy-making process for exert-
ing pressure. They may participate di-
rectly in the decision-making process 
by attending the committees for health 
care policies under a corporatist regime 
or utilise various veto points which the 
existing constitution allows.1 Immergut 
holds that Swiss and French doctors hin-
dered the introduction of the National 
Health Service (NHS) in their respec-
tive countries by exploiting veto points: 
the Swiss doctors used the referendum, 
while the French doctors utilised the 
multi-party parliamentary system where 
doctors positioned themselves in the 
parliament as important coalition part-
ners (Immergut, 1992). Hacker also ar-
gues that a general reform of the health 
system is less feasible in a fragmented 
political system which provides many 
veto points (Hacker, 2002). 
According to this view, doctors’ in-
fluence on a policy can be both con-
strained and facilitated by the structures 
of the policy-making process. Consi-
dering corporatist committees, they are 
sometimes designed to reduce the direct 
participation of the medical profession. 
Giaimo explains the decline of doctors’ 
influence in the UK and Germany dur-
ing the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
1 Immergut names the institutions involved in 
a policy-making process as ‘veto points’ which 
doctors could exploit for hindering a health 
care reform, such as the parliament with a 
multi-party system in France and the referen-
















with challenges against corporatist bar-
gains between the government and doc-
tors (Giaimo, 1995). In a similar way, 
Döhler presents the ‘architectural’ acti-
vities of the German government which 
has reduced doctors’ voice vis-à-vis sick-
ness funds in the corporatist system 
(Döhler, 1995). Considering political 
structure, some constitutional systems 
make it difficult for doctors to find veto 
points. Immergut attributes the success-
ful introduction of the NHS in Sweden 
to the executive-centred centralised 
system (Immergut, 1992). Hacker also 
agrees that the UK and the Netherlands 
which have centralised systems achieved 
reforms at least in a visual sense (Hacker, 
2002).2 Moreover, other political factors 
such as party politics and salient con-
temporary issues have influence on doc-
tors’ utilisation of veto points. 
The structures of the policy-making 
process provide public authority with 
institutions within which it makes deci-
sions on a policy: some of them facili-
tate doctors’ lobbying and participation 
in the policy-making process and others 
do not. 
Outside of the formal policy-making 
process
With all constraints of the structures 
of the formal policy-making process, 
doctors may try to exert influence on 
policy-making by collective actions out-
side of the formal policy-making pro-
cess. Doctors’ monopoly of medical ex-
pertise can make their collective actions 
more powerful. As doctors are recog-
nised as the sole experts in medical sci-
entific treatment in modern (or West-
ern) medicine, it is almost impossible 
2 Actually, however, Hacker criticises these re-
forms as ‘reform without change’, as the title 
of his article shows. 
to implement a health care policy with-
out their co-operation. Freidson holds 
that doctors are recognised both public-
ly and socially as the dominant medical 
profession. According to him, as medi-
cine became more complex and scien-
tific, doctors claimed that they were the 
sole experts in medicine and struggled 
against quackery. The state supported 
this professionalisation in medicine by 
way of providing a public licensing sys-
tem, and society also recognised doctors 
as the only qualified providers of medi-
cal treatment (Freidson, 1970). More-
over, doctors’ indispensability tends 
to be augmented by a demanding and 
time-consuming medical training. As 
Marmor and Thomas put it, if doctors 
strike against a medical policy, the go-
vernment ‘can seldom provide a short-
-run substitute’ for them (Marmor and 
Thomas, 1972: 436). In sum, their po-
tential threat of boycott is likely to make 
them a very powerful pressure group. 
For mobilising collective actions, 
doctors’ organisational solidarity will be 
important. Doctors may be divided into 
various factions according to working 
places and departments, and these fac-
tions tend to have different interests in 
a policy. Even if there is an established 
and influential representative medical 
association, it would be relatively diffi-
cult for this association to combine di-
verging interests and represent them ef-
fectively. Freddi argues that one of the 
reasons why French and Italian doctors 
have a weak influence is because their 
associations are fragmented (Freddi and 
Bjorkman, 1989). Döhler also points out 
the fragmentation of German doctors, 
which hindered them from effective-
ly responding to the cost-containment 

























In addition, the government’s re-
sponse to collective actions will also 
matter. If the government hardly tolera-
tes any collective action against govern-
ment policies, the mobilisation of a col-
lective action will be costly, so that the 
possibility of collective action becomes 
low. On the other hand, the government 
may be little responsive to the demands 
of the groups conducting collective ac-
tions. In other words, under an oppres-
sive government, collective action may 
be a less efficient instrument for doctors 
to achieve their policy preferences. 
3.2. Democratisation and doctors’ 
political influence
Democratisation denotes a political 
shift from a non-democratic system to a 
democratic one. Dahl defines democra-
cy as ‘the continuing responsiveness of 
the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals’, 
and a political system should provide 
all citizens with means to formulate and 
signify their preferences; these preferen-
ces should be ‘weighted equally in the 
conduct of the government’ (Dahl, 1971: 
1-2). Therefore, democratisation sys-
tematically alters a political system from 
one little responsive to the preferences of 
citizens to a responsive one. 
In this sense, democratisation fos-
ters a diversified policy-making process 
by providing a wider range of freedom 
to organise associations and mobilise 
collective action. As Dahl puts it, ‘the 
greater the opportunities for express-
ing, organizing, and representing politi-
cal preferences, the greater the number 
and variety of preferences and interests 
that are likely to be represented in poli-
cy-making’ (Dahl, 1971: 26). 
Democratisation also tends to pro-
vide wider opportunities for social 
groups to participate in the policy-mak-
ing process. As movements for demo-
cratisation are usually against centrali-
sed and hierarchical authoritarian rules, 
democratisation can result in stronger 
egalitarian claims for more devolved and 
open decision-making structures. Thus, 
democracy can be defined as ‘the extent 
to which the political power of the elite 
is minimized and that of the nonelite is 
maximized’ (Bollen, 1980: 372). 
Democratisation may promote doc-
tors’ influence on policies, as it enhan-
ces their voices vis-à-vis the govern-
ment. The policy-making process will 
not be as much of the ‘command-and-
-control’ type as under an authoritarian 
government. In committees doctors will 
be regarded as discussion partners ra-
ther than as subjects of government con-
trol. In addition, the strengthened Legis-
lature will be a new veto point available 
for doctors to check the executive-cen-
tred policy-making. Outside of the poli-
cy-making process, the enhanced free-
dom of assembly will make it less costly 
for doctors to mobilise collective actions 
against policies, and the government will 
be more responsive to their demands. 
However, democratisation may also 
decrease doctors’ political influence, as 
it facilitates the participation of other 
social groups in the policy-making 
process. Democratisation enables those 
groups excluded from this corporatism, 
such as medical consumers, to organise 
their own associations and participate in 
the policy-making process. In addition, 
the increased freedom of association 
may hurt internal unity among doctors, 

















4. SPD and doctors’ political influence 
in Korea
4.1. SPD in the authoritarian period 
1982-1985
During the first period, the autho-
ritarian Chun Doo-Hwan government, 
which had taken political power via a 
coup d’état, ruled over Korea. It attempted 
to implement an SPD pilot programme 
in Mokpo City between 1982 and 1985, 
as a part of the pilot programme of the 
Second Level Health Insurance scheme 
that expanded the National Health In-
surance (NHI) coverage to farmers and 
fishers. 
This pilot programme was due to 
the demands of pharmacists, who were 
generally excluded from the NHI un-
til the end of the 1980s. They felt threa-
tened because the NHI covered pre-
scribed medicines, and its expansion 
would drive more consumers of me-
dicines to clinics or hospitals. This pilot 
programme caught doctors’ and phar-
macists’ attention nation-wide, and they 
believed that the SPD would be applied 
nationally if universal population cover-
age of the NHI was accomplished. 
The executive-centred authoritarian 
government bypassed the National As-
sembly – instead of revising the Phar-
maceutical Affairs Law, the Ministry 
of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA) 
promoted the SPD with administrative 
guidelines or by enforcing agreements 
between doctors and pharmacists. 
The central associations represent-
ing doctors and pharmacists – the Ko-
rean Medical Association (KMA) and 
the Korean Pharmaceutical Association 
(KPA) – were the main interest groups. 
Although freedom of assembly was de-
nied, the KPA managed to close down 
pharmacies in June 1982, demanding a 
compulsory implementation of the SPD, 
while the KMA warned that there was a 
possibility of boycott. However, the au-
thoritarian government responded to 
this collective action in a harsh man-
ner. It assembled an emergency cabinet 
which even the Minister of Defence at-
tended, and threatened to arrest the KPA 
leaders unless they stopped the boycott 
immediately. The KPA could not but 
open pharmacies on the following day. 
The MHSA set up a committee at-
tended by representatives of the KMA 
and the KPA: the Consultative Com-
mittee for the Medical and Pharmaceu-
tical Cooperation (CCMPC). However, 
the Consultative Committee did not 
play a crucial role in the process of the 
SPD. Instead, the MHSA assumed all re-
sponsibility, and the KMA and the KPA 
contacted its officials and politicians in-
dividually. The KMA’s lobby effort was 
rather successful; the vice minister of the 
MHSA, who used to be a surgeon gene-
ral, promised not to enforce the SPD, 
and the administrative guideline on the 
SPD included no compulsion. 
However, when the MHSA was de-
termined to implement the SPD with 
a stronger measure, it even bypassed 
the KMA and the KPA. As the number 
of prescriptions that doctors issued for 
pharmacists did not increase sufficient-
ly, the MHSA worked directly with me-
dical and pharmaceutical associations in 
Mokpo City in 1984, and strongly per-
suaded regional medical and pharma-
ceutical associations to make an annual 
contract so that the National Health In-
surance (NHI) would not reimburse for 
the costs of drugs that doctors dispensed 
instead of issuing prescriptions to phar-
macists. In fact, the MHSA had already 
outlined the contents of the contract be-
























gional medical and pharmaceutical as-
sociations. The contract came into force 
commencing May 1984 and terminat-
ed in December 1984. It increased the 
number of prescriptions dramatically 
from 1,244 in April 1984 to more than 
35,000 in May 1984. Though expressing 
its dissatisfaction, the KMA could not 
but confirm this enforced agreement at 
the central level. 
Nevertheless, the MHSA was not 
willing to extend this contract against 
the will of the KMA. When the KMA re-
fused to extend the contract in the fol-
lowing year, the MHSA decided not to 
disappoint doctors with the SPD issue. 
It ended the SPD pilot programme in 
1985. 
All in all, the policy-making pro-
cess in the early 1980s shows features 
of an authoritarian style of corporat-
ism. Doctors (and pharmacists) were re-
presented in the policy-making process 
through central associations, such as the 
KMA (and the KPA). The government 
contacted these central associations and 
even invited them in committees. The 
government tried not to dissatisfy either 
of these corporatist partners. 
However, neither the KMA nor the 
KPA was an equal policy partner of the 
government. Committees did not work 
very well. Instead, the government made 
direct contacts with the KMA and the 
KPA individually. The government did 
not allow them to dare and challenge 
any of its decisions. Once the govern-
ment made a decision, the KMA and the 
KPA could not but follow it. 
In this situation, the KMA could play 
a limited role as a veto player. The KMA 
could utilise the government’s will to 
avoid dissatisfying either side. Howev-
er, the KMA could not directly oppose 
the decisions of the government. Conse-
quently, the resulted policy output was 
the implementation of the SPD by eco-
nomic incentives. The KMA succeeded 
in dissuading the government from uti-
lising a compulsory regulation for the 
implementation of the SPD. However, 
when the government chose a strong 
economic incentive for the SPD, the 
KMA could not but follow it. 
4.2. SPD in the transitional period 
1987-1991
During the second period, Korean 
politics began the process of democrati-
sation, in which the government allowed 
more freedom to organise associations. 
In 1987, the transition to democracy be-
gan in Korea with the introduction of 
a free electoral system. However, in the 
presidential election held in this year, 
Rho Tae-Woo, the candidate from the 
authoritarian ruling party, was elected. 
Wishing to distance itself from the au-
thoritarian image, this government was 
reluctant to be repressive towards socie-
ty. Consequently, freedom of association 
and assembly increased. 
Nevertheless, newly organised civic 
associations were not directly involved 
in the policy-making process. In the 
first place, they were still under con-
struction, and as most of their mem-
bers were devoted to democratisation 
movements, pharmaceutical reform did 
not yet attract their attention as much 
as other political issues. Secondly, they 
were hostile to the government, the suc-
cessor to the former authoritarian re-
gime. Thus they avoided the committees 
that the government sponsored, and the 
government was also reluctant to invite 
NGOs to those committees. As a result, 
the KMA and the KPA were, again, the 
















The government tried to achieve 
universal population coverage of the 
NHI as a means of political legitimation, 
and the MHSA organised committees 
for this aim. Here, the SPD issue arose 
again between doctors and pharmacists. 
Though the National Assembly was also 
involved in the policy-making process, 
its role was essentially limited to passing 
the government bill based on the deci-
sions of the committees. 
In those corporatist committees the 
MHSA suggested an incremental in-
crease in compulsory SPD. Faced with 
the KMA’s objection, however, it elimi-
nated doctors’ legal obligation from the 
SPD. This new proposal brought about 
a series of strikes and rallies by pharma-
cists. The government was not willing 
to repress them, yet nor was it willing to 
arbitrate in the conflict between doctors 
and pharmacists. 
Instead, the government suspended 
any decision on the SPD. As compensa-
tion for pharmacists, the MHSA provid-
ed a Pharmaceutical Insurance System 
(PIS) that reimbursed for certain medi-
cines dispensed without prescription. 
Indeed, the MHSA provided a go-
vernment bill on the revision of the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, and sub-
mitted it to the National Assembly in 
November 1989. The bill contained the 
implementation of the SPD commen-
cing July 1991. Nevertheless, the National 
Assembly refused to accept this revision, 
as the KMA did not agree with it. As a 
result, the bill was not even discussed in 
the National Assembly for two years un-
til November 1991, and then the article 
of the bill on the SPD was deleted. 
All in all, the second period shows in-
creasing influence of social participants 
in corporatism in the first stage of de-
mocratisation. The late 1980s was a peri-
od where democratisation started, while 
the existing framework of authoritarian 
corporatism remained. As democratisa-
tion increased social groups’ influences 
vis-à-vis the government, the KMA and 
the KPA could volume up their voices 
in committees and meetings with the 
government. In addition, the promoted 
freedom of association enabled these so-
cial actors to mobilise collective actions 
more easily. 
Moreover, the traditional partici-
pants in corporatism – the KMA and 
the KPA – were not checked by new-
comers. As new actors had not yet been 
well organised and included in the poli-
cy-making process, traditional corpora-
tist partners kept enjoying the monopo-
ly of participation in the policy-making 
process as social groups. 
In this situation, doctors’ veto effort 
increased. The government did not at-
tempt to enforce the KMA and the KPA 
to produce an agreement for the SPD. 
Moreover, the National Assembly, which 
was strengthened due to the democrati-
sation, required a voluntary agreement 
between the KMA and the KPA, which 
made these associations clear veto play-
ers. Instead of enforcing the KMA to 
make any concession with the KPA, the 
government could not but just give up 
the SPD. Instead, the government cre-
ated a new institution, the PIS, in order 
to satisfy the KPA. The transitional stage 
of democratisation made doctors, repre-
sented by the KMA, a strong veto player, 
and the policy output was abandonment 
of the SPD. 
4.3. SPD in the democratic period 
1998-2000
During the third period, Kim Dae-
-Jung, a prominent former opposition 
























actively invited new associations, such 
as consumers’ associations, to corpo-
ratist committees, and recruited some 
NGO members into the government and 
the ruling party. NGOs were no longer 
hostile towards the government. As Ko-
rea became increasingly democratised 
and the former opposition party gained 
political power, they began to turn their 
attention from political to more social 
issues, such as consumers’ rights, and 
launched a ‘legal’ route for social move-
ments.
With the participation of those asso-
ciations, the government launched the 
SPD as a pharmaceutical market reform. 
It was intended to promote the trans-
parency of the market as well as con-
sumers’ rights by disclosing prescrip-
tions to patients and pharmacists. Such 
committees as the SPD Steering Com-
mittee (SPDSC) and the SPD Executive 
Committee (SPDEC) were organised, in 
which not only the representatives of the 
KMA and the KPA but also consumers’ 
associations participated. 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MoHW – the former MHSA) led the 
SPD process again by organising those 
committees and prepared the govern-
ment bill for the revision of the Phar-
maceutical Affairs Law. However, in this 
period the National Assembly played a 
more active role in guaranteeing that 
the bill would be the result of a mutu-
al agreement between doctors and phar-
macists – it did not allow the MoHW to 
arbitrate on the SPD issue. However, the 
National Assembly strengthened con-
sumers’ associations, a strong support-
ing group to the SPD, by authorising 
them to mediate between the KMA and 
the KPA. In December 1999 it passed the 
government bill based on the agreement 
among the KMA, the KPA and consum-
ers’ associations. The revised Pharma-
ceutical Affairs Law banned clinics and 
hospitals from dispensing medicines for 
outpatients. 
This intensified internal division 
among doctors. Those who had more 
economic interest in dispensing medi-
cines, such as physicians and paediatri-
cians, organised themselves inside and 
outside of the KMA, occupied leading 
positions in the KMA, and led a series 
of rallies in 2000, which then developed 
into general medical strikes. Neverthe-
less, although they succeeded in chang-
ing details of the SPD, they failed to 
hinder its implementation in July 2000. 
Public opinion was hostile to these medi-
cal strikes, and the government and the 
ruling party, as well as consumers’ asso-
ciations, were not willing to surrender to 
them. 
The late 1990s show a waning in-
fluence of doctors in the SPD policy-
-making process. Newcomers, such as 
progressive experts and consumers, fi-
nally appeared in the policy-making pro-
cess, and challenged the corporatist sys-
tem and its partners. Consequently, the 
KMA lost its privileged position in the 
negotiations between the government 
and social groups. 
On the other hand, the tide of de-
mocratisation entered into doctors’ so-
ciety, so that doctors became divided 
according to their factional interests. 
Factions of doctors distrusted leaders of 
the KMA and even organised their own 
associations. Therefore, the KMA could 
not set a clear policy orientation. 
Indeed, doctors finally succeeded in 
mobilising medical strikes. However, the 
timing was too late, since the Pharma-
ceutical Affairs Law had already been 
revised according to the ideas of pro-
















only partial revisions of the details of the 
SPD, failing to hinder the implementa-
tion of the SPD itself. 
Therefore, at least with respect to the 
SPD, doctors’ political influence became 
even weaker under the democratic go-
vernment in the late 1990s than under 
the authoritarian one in the early 1980s, 
so that the policy output was the imple-
mentation of the SPD in a coercive way 
by revision of the Law. 
5. Discussion 
This paper examined the impacts of 
democratisation on doctors’ influence 
on policies, especially their veto capaci-
ty on the separation of prescribing and 
dispensing (SPD). Democratisation di-
versified the policy-making process, and 
increased the freedom of association and 
assembly. Would these political chan-
ges have positive or negative impacts on 
doctors’ veto capacity? 
An empirical study over three peri-
ods – 1982-1985, 1987-1991 and 1997-
-2000 – demonstrates the changes in 
doctors’ veto capacity during different 
sequences of democratisation. It shows 
that doctors’ veto capacity increased in 
the early period of democratisation, but 
decreased in the later period. Moreover, 
when comparing the first and third peri-
ods, doctors’ veto capacity was higher in 
the former than in the latter. 
This result suggests that democrati-
sation can improve doctors’ veto capaci-
ty in the first stage and then reduce it. 
Even an authoritarian government may 
well invite doctors into a corporatist sys-
tem, although this system is still under 
control of the authoritarian government. 
In this system, doctors will be represent-
ed by a central association (in the Kore-
an case, the KMA), in order to facilitate 
its regulation over doctors’ society. 
In the transition period, democra-
tisation can increase doctors’ political 
influence. A top-down relationship be-
tween the government and social groups 
under the previous authoritarian regime 
will change to a more liberal and equal 
relationship. However, outsiders of the 
authoritarian corporatist system are not 
yet ready to organise themselves and join 
the committees among the government 
and social groups. In this situation, the 
central medical association, a partner of 
the existing corporatist system, can en-
joy the liberal and equal atmosphere of 
the corporatist system without challen-
ges from outside. 
By contrast, as democratisation co-
mes to be consolidated, doctors’ voice 
can decrease. On the one hand, new so-
cial groups, who are now organised and 
ready to participate in the policy-mak-
ing process, challenge the corporatist 
system. The voices of these new actors 
will cancel out doctors’ voice in the po-
licy-making process. On the other hand, 
doctors’ central association, which itself 
is a heritage of the previous authorita-
rian regime, can face challenges from 
the rank-and-file. 
This research gives an implication to 
the study of democratisation. It suggests 
that, instead of merely comparing the 
pre- and post-democratisation periods, 
a research on democratisation needs to 
consider the flow of the democratisa-
tion process in a wider time horizon. 
In a short period, democratisation may 
strengthen the social groups which have 
already been powerful under the pre-
vious authoritarian regime. They have 
developed their political and organisa-
tional resources under the authoritari-
an corporatist system, while outsiders 
of the system have not. However, in the 
























late their resources, and finally be able to 
challenge the corporatist system. In this 
sense, a study of democratisation needs 
to review and analyse a longer histori-
cal flow of political and organisational 
changes, as well as the resulting changes 
of the policy-making processes and their 
policy outputs. 
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Demokratizacija i politički utjecaj liječnika: razdvajanje 
propisivanja i izdavanja lijekova u Koreji
SAŽETAK  U ovom je radu riječ o odnosu između demokratizacije i političkog utjecaja li-
ječnika u zdravstvenoj politici u slučaju razdvajanja propisivanja i izdavanja lijekova u Ko-
reji. Zahvaljujući svojim profesionalnim i institucionalnim značajkama liječnici se smatraju 
jednom od najmoćnijih skupina za pritisak. Demokratizacija možda ima dva uzajamno su-
protstavljena učinka: (1) pravo veta koje imaju liječnici može se povećati s njihovim sve ve-
ćim pravom glasa nasuprot vladi, i (2) ono se može smanjiti jer ne samo središnja liječnič-
ka komora nego i druge društvene skupine, kao što su medicinski potrošači i podskupine 
liječnika, stječu veće pravo glasa. U ovom se radu analizira slučaj razdvajanja propisivanja 
i izdavanja lijekova u Koreji, koje je sprečavalo liječnike da izdaju lijekove. Proces razdvaja-
nja propisivanja i izdavanja lijekova uspoređuje se u autoritarnom razdoblju (1982-1985), 
prijelaznom razdoblju (1987-1991) i demokratskom razdoblju (1998-2000). Zaključuje se 
da se politički utjecaj liječnika povećao u prijelaznom razdoblju, a zatim počeo opadati sa 
sazrijevanjem demokratizacije.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  demokratizacija, politički utjecaj liječnika, razdvajanje propisivanja i iz-
davanja lijekova
